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SUBSIDIARITY IN THE MAINTENANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY
MACHIKO KANETAKE*
I
INTRODUCTION
The allocation of authority among multiple decision-making bodies involves
the prioritization of one normative value over another. Subsidiarity, a principle
regarding the allocation of authority, favors “decentralised decision making” at
a lower level of governance over “centralised decisionmaking” at a higher level
1
of governance. Centralization here means that one body’s decisions restrict
other actors’ autonomous choices in a given society. In giving preference to
localized decisionmaking, subsidiarity makes a particular normative claim that
places greater importance on autonomy, diversity, and individual liberty than
on effectiveness, coherence, and unity, which demand centralized
2
decisionmaking. In the Catholic social thought in which the principle of
3
subsidiarity was first articulated, subsidiarity was ultimately meant to help
humans flourish, and one’s immediate human communities were considered as
4
the best site for human flourishing. Given that subsidiarity is a normative claim,
a shift of decision-making authority from one level to another would likely
accompany a change in the prioritization of normative foundations on which the
decisionmaking is based.
International law essentially embraces the normative claim of subsidiarity: it
is based on each state’s consent to be bound by a rule without any centralized
legislative body. While subsidiarity is by no means established as a general
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1. Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmermann, The Global Relevance of Subsidiarity: An Overview,
in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY 1, 3–4 (Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmermann eds.,
2014) [hereinafter GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES] (noting that subsidiarity does not rule out the need for
centralized decisionmaking, but that the need depends on the circumstances).
2. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994); Augusto Zimmermann, Subsidiarity,
Democracy and Individual Liberty in Brazil, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 85, 88–89.
3. QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, ENCYCLICAL OF POPE PIUS XI ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
SOCIAL ORDER (1931), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903–1939, 427–28, ¶¶ 78, 80 (Claudia
Carlen Ihm, 1981); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine,
in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 29, 31–36.
4. Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity: The Concept and the Connections, 4 ETHICAL PERSP. 117, 118–
19 (1997).
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principle in international law, its decentralized law-making processes almost
take for granted the idea of subsidiarity, not only as a matter of fact, but also
due to its respect for the principle of sovereign equality and the autonomy of
every state. At the same time, the decentralized processes through which
international law is made, applied, and enforced have been incrementally
modified since the mid–twentieth century by the establishment of the United
Nations (UN), the UN’s invigoration after the 1990s, and the growth of other
international organizations and international courts. The active presence of
international organizations and international courts in the creation, application,
and enforcement of international law revived the question of subsidiarity as to
how much international organizations and courts ought to respect the
autonomy of each state’s decisionmaking.
The maintenance of international peace and security, which is the topic of
this article, is by no means immune to this question of subsidiarity. In essence,
this area of law is increasingly torn between normative claims for centralization
and those for decentralization. On the one hand, centralization is an ethos of
5
collective security established under the UN Charter, and the UN Security
Council’s internationally binding decisions also prevail over any other
6
international agreements. Within the framework of Jachtenfuchs and Krisch’s
introduction to this symposium, the maintenance of international peace and
security appears to be one of the fields “in which a strong presumption in favor
7
of the local is undesirable.” On the other hand, especially since the 1990s, the
Security Council’s exercise of authority has had significant impact on the rights
of individuals; illustrative are the practices of targeted sanctions, territorial
administrations, and ad hoc international criminal tribunals. This exercise of
authority has led to an increased call for bringing some of the decision-making
processes back to the national level as a site more capable of ensuring respect
8
for the rights of those affected individuals.
Against this background, this article analyzes how these opposite normative
claims have arisen with regard to the Security Council’s mandate and whether
there are any criteria under international law with which to balance these
claims. In this article, the terms “subsidiarity” and “decentralization” are often
used interchangeably; yet it must be reiterated that subsidiarity is much broader
than decentralization. Subsidiarity is a value-laden claim that decentralized
decisionmaking, as opposed to centralized decisionmaking, better protects
autonomy, diversity, and individual liberty.

5. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 8.
8. In the context of targeted sanctions, see Stephan Hollenberg, The Security Council’s 1267/1989
Targeted Sanctions Regime and the Use of Confidential Information: A Proposal for Decentralization of
Review, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 49, 62–69 (2015).
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This article deals with the locus of decisionmakers between the Security
9
Council and its member states. The article makes particular reference to the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has
encountered tension during the last decade between, on the one hand, the
effective maintenance of international peace and security at the Security
Council’s level, and on the other hand, the protection of individuals’ rights at
the level of member states. Part II.A of this article provides an overview of how
the UN Charter concentrates decisionmaking at the Security Council for the
imperative aim of international peace and security. Parts II.B and III show how
the demand for decentralization reemerged with the greater relevance of the
Council to individuals’ rights. Any compromise between the two claims
struggles to be successful owing to their opposite nature. Yet the Security
Council and its member states cannot afford to avoid such a struggle, as they
are all committed to maintaining international peace and security and
respecting individuals’ fundamental rights.
II
CENTRALIZED DECISIONMAKING
The Security Council is an outcome of World War II that legitimized the
restriction on individual states’ autonomous decisionmaking. In an essentially
decentralized legal order, the UN Charter did its best to concentrate
decisionmaking at the Security Council, whose priority, as discussed in part
II.A, has been recognized outside the Charter’s treaty regime. Since receiving
this power designated to it by the Charter, the Security Council has been
exercising its centralized authority through its subsidiary organs in determining
the status of individuals, as explained in part II.B.
A. Elements of Centralization
Although the term “centralization” is typically associated with a modern
10
state with the authority to make and enforce law, in this article centralization is
more broadly understood to signify that one body’s decisions restrict other
actors’ autonomous choice in a given society. Despite being a “legalised
11
hegemony,” the Security Council is by no means a centralized lawmaker or
law-enforcer as it is ordinarily contemplated for a modern state. The Security
Council’s decisions are, in principle, binding only on member states and only at
the international level. Enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the
9. It does not devote itself to the question of competence allocation between the Security Council
and regional organizations. See generally W. Andy Knight, Towards a Subsidiarity Model for
Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Operational, 17
THIRD WORLD Q. 31 (1996); David O’Brien, The Search for Subsidiarity: The UN, African Regional
Organizations and Humanitarian Action, 7 INT’L. PEACEKEEPING 57 (2000).
10. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100–02 (1952).
11. See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 165–93 (2004) (discussing the processes through which states
agree to legalize under the UN Charter the hegemonic power of the UN Security Council).
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Charter are triggered by threats to the peace, and are probably not intended to
be “sanctions” against a violation of Charter obligations or other international
12
obligations. The Security Council’s authority is derived from the treaty
concluded by states, which are instead the primary lawmakers and enforcers in
the international legal order. Through the following three interrelated elements
of the UN Charter, states have agreed, however, to centralize decisionmaking at
the Security Council.
1. Collective Security
The first element is the idea of “collective security” itself, the very essence
of which is to limit decentralized responses when a member acts against any
other members and jeopardizes a common security interest. The Charter
institutionalized the idea by prohibiting the use of force by individual states and
by empowering the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures under
13
Chapter VII and internationally binding decisions under Article 25. Although
a member state can still resort to the use of force in self-defense, it is presumed
to be of a temporary nature until the Security Council has taken measures
14
necessary to maintain international peace and security. The UN is based on an
unsuccessful attempt by the League of Nations to limit self-help, which
15
characterizes a decentralized legal order. This attempt was hampered by the
limited prohibition of war, the unanimous decision-making process, and the
16
nonparticipation of the United States. Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, which reserved to individual states the right to resort
to self-help if the Council of the League of Nations fails to reach a report, was
the treaty’s most significant shortcoming. By remedying the weaknesses of its
predecessor, the UN Charter transformed this decentralized international legal
disorder of self-help to a collective system in which the use of force by
individual states is prohibited. As the Security Council broadened the concept
of international peace and security and a threat to the peace, the system of
collective security under the Charter has been applied, not only to inter-state
17
military confrontations, but also a wide range of non-inter-state situations.
2. Primary Responsibility
The second element through which the UN Charter concentrated
decisionmaking at the Security Council is provided by Article 24(1), which
entrusts the Security Council with the “primary”—as opposed to subsidiary—

12. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 789–90 (1950).
13. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, arts. 25, 39–42.
14. Id. art. 51.
15. HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (1957); KELSEN,
supra note 10, at 15–17.
16. See League of Nations Covenant art. 5, ¶ 1, arts. 12, 13, ¶ 4, art. 15, ¶ 6, art. 15 ¶ 7; ROBERT
KOLB, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT DES NATIONS UNIES 26–31 (2008).
17. See infra Part II.B.1.
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responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
“Responsibility” in this particular treaty provision falls short of constituting an
18
obligation, yet it appears to signify a task rather than a mere competence.
Under Article 24(1) of the Charter, the Security Council’s primary
responsibility is regarded as instrumental to “prompt and effective action” in
19
the maintenance of international peace and security. In theory, the provision is
meant to prioritize the Security Council over the General Assembly, and not
20
over member states’ authorities or any other entities outside of the UN.
Nevertheless, the phrase “primary responsibility” has been invoked, from time
to time, beyond the UN’s treaty regime as if it is a normative indication of the
priority of the Security Council over a guardian of other purposes of
21
international law, such as the promotion of respect for human rights.
Illustrative in this regard is the reasoning of the ECtHR, an international
22
court outside of the domain of the UN Charter, in Behrami and Saramati, in
which the Strasbourg Court referred to the “imperative nature” of the Security
23
Council’s powers and the “primary responsibility” of the Council. In this case,
the applicants brought proceedings against states that were stationed in Kosovo
24
as part of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the
25
Kosovo Force. In rendering the application inadmissible on the basis of the
attribution of the conduct of states to the UN, the ECtHR drew attention to
the imperative nature of the principle aim of the UN and, consequently, of the powers
accorded to the UNSC under Chapter VII to fulfil that aim. . . . [I]t is evident from the
Preamble, Articles 1, 2 and 24 as well as Chapter VII of the Charter that the primary
objective of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security. While it is
equally clear that ensuring respect for human rights represents an important
contribution to achieving international peace . . . , the fact remains that the UNSC has
26
primary responsibility . . . to fulfil [sic] this objective . . .

On this basis, the ECtHR, in order to not undermine the effectiveness of the
27
UN’s operations for its “imperative peace and security aim,” observed that

18. See Anne Peters, Article 24, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
761, 766–67, ¶¶ 13, 18 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). Regional organizations, which can act as
regional arrangements within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, employ the concept of
“primary responsibility,” although its meaning is multi-faceted. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI,
COLLECTIVE SECURITY 117–20 (2011).
19. Peters, supra note 18, at 772, ¶ 35.
20. Id. at 767, ¶ 17.
21. Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No.
71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 148 (2007).
22. Behrami, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42–43 (2007).
23. Id. at 42–43, ¶ 148.
24. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶¶ 5, 10, 11 (June 10, 1999).
25. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9.
26. Behrami, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42–43, ¶ 148 (2007) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 43, ¶ 149.
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the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] cannot be interpreted in a manner
which would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting
Parties which are covered
28
by UNSC Resolutions . . . to the scrutiny of the Court.

The Strasbourg Court made these remarks presumably to indicate the
relative weight of the Security Council’s mandate in comparison to the
protection of human rights, and supposedly to explain why the Strasbourg
Court deferred to the UN organ and its imperative mandate. The ECtHR
referred to the reasoning of Behrami and Saramati in its subsequent case of
29
Mothers of Srebrenica, which addressed the compatibility of the grant of
jurisdictional immunity to the UN with the right of access to a court. In likewise
dismissing the human rights complaint, the Strasbourg Court reaffirmed the
importance of the fulfillment of the UN’s key mission in the field of
30
international peace and security.
Overall, these limited cases show that the regional human rights court
assumed both the priority of the Security Council’s competence for the effective
maintenance of international peace and security and the relative importance of
31
the Security Council’s mandate over the protection of human rights. When the
member states’ courts follow the Strasbourg Court’s reasoning, the competence
of the Security Council is preserved not only at the international level, but also
in the domestic legal order.
3. Primacy of Charter Obligations
Article 103 embodies the third element by which the UN Charter
32
concentrated decisionmaking at the Security Council. The provision provides a
normative hierarchy of Charter obligations over other conflicting obligations
that member states owe under international agreements. It bears particular
importance to the Security Council, which is the only UN organ with the
33
general authority to render binding decisions for its mandate, and whose
internationally binding decisions prevail over any other obligations under
34
international agreement. Of course, the primacy applies not only to the
Security Council’s binding decisions but also to other Charter obligations. For

28. Id.
29. Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R 255.
30. Id. at 279, ¶ 154 (referring to Behrami and Saramati at 43, ¶ 149).
31. But see infra Parts III.B, C.
32. Article 103 of the UN Charter reads, “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”
33. The General Assembly’s authority to render binding “decisions” is over the UN’s
organizational issues. See U.N. Charter arts. 5, 6, 17, 18, ¶ 2; S. W. Afr. Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v.
S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 50–51 (July 18); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article
17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151, 163 (July 20).
34. U.N. Charter art. 25; Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), Provisional
Measure, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 15, ¶ 39 (Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.),
Provisional Measure, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114, 126, ¶ 42 (Apr. 14).
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instance, the primacy applies to the obligation of member states to award
immunities to the UN and its officials under Article 105(1)–(2) of the Charter;
35
this renders it difficult to readily apply the reasoning of Waite & Kennedy to
the immunities granted to the UN, inasmuch as the obligation under Article
36
105(1) of the Charter prevails over member states’ human rights obligations.
Yet the primacy of the obligation under Article 105(1) still has relevance to the
Security Council’s subsidiary organs, which undertake peacekeeping operations
in various parts of the world and enjoy jurisdictional immunities in a host state.
Article 103 of the UN Charter therefore effectively signifies a preferential
status of the Security Council’s exercise of authority over member states’ other
commitments under international agreements.
In principle, Article 103 of the UN Charter is a treaty provision applicable
to UN member states, and it does not establish any general rule of hierarchy in
37
38
international law. Despite the Charter’s constitutional characteristics, Article
103 does not in theory establish an overarching rule for resolving normative
conflicts between multiple treaty regimes. It is thus important to assess how
Article 103 of the Charter is understood, in practice, by international and
national courts in their application of other international treaties.
A relatively clear sign of deference to the supremacy of Charter obligations
39
came from the U.K. House of Lords (now Supreme Court) in Al Jedda, a 2007
case concerning the human rights compatibility of the applicant’s detention by
the British force deployed as part of the Security Council–authorized
40
multinational forces in Iraq. Having identified a clash between the power to
41
detain, as authorized by Security Council Resolution 1546, and the protection
of the applicant’s right to liberty and security under Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the U.K. House of Lords held that the
phrase “any other international agreement” in Article 103 of the Charter
“leaves no room for any excepted category” and that binding Security Council
42
decisions supersede all other treaty commitments.
In summary, the idea and system of collective security under Articles 24(1)
and 103 of the UN Charter, in conjunction with Article 25 and Chapter VII,
present a decisive normative articulation that the centralized responses
necessary for the effective maintenance of international peace and security

35. Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 393, 407–12.
36. See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R 255, ¶¶ 152–69.
37. Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Collective Security and Human Rights, in HIERARCHY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 42, 63–64 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds.,
2012).
38. Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 568–84 (1998).
39. Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd071212/jedda-1.htm.
40. S.C. Res. 1546, ¶¶ 9–10 (June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13 (Oct. 16, 2003).
41. S.C. Res. 1546, annex at 11 (June 8, 2004).
42. Al-Jedda, [2007] UKHL 58, ¶ 35.
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should not be disturbed by member states and their other international legal
commitments. Such a normative claim has been recognized beyond the
Charter’s treaty regime. At the same time, as explained in part III.B below, the
Security Council’s preferential status has been incrementally counterbalanced
through some of the affected individuals’ judicial proceedings in pursuit of
better human rights protection.
B. Extent of Centralization
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council could
potentially engage in determining three groups of issues: (1) whether a
particular situation qualifies as a matter of international peace and whether it
amounts to one of the triggers under Article 39 of the Charter; (2) whether
enforcement measures ought to be taken, what types of enforcement measures
should be applied, and against whom those measures should be applied; and (3)
through what means such measures should be implemented. Over the years, the
Security Council and its subsidiary organs became involved in these stages in a
way that allows member states to have little discretion over individuals under
their jurisdiction.
1. Extending the Concept of International Peace
Although the system of collective security under the Charter was established
as a system to respond to inter-state military confrontations, the Security
Council has been applying the concepts of “international peace and security”
and “threats to the peace” to a number of non-inter-state situations such as civil
wars, humanitarian crises, and the systematic violations of international
43
humanitarian and human rights law in armed conflicts. The extension was
partly in response to the advocacy in the 1960s and 1970s of newly independent
Asian and African states, which, having encountered the Rhodesian and South
African questions, urged the inclusion of human rights agendas into the matter
44
of international peace and security and even preempted the Security Council
45
in determining the threats. The conceptual extension, which illustrates the
Security Council’s greater emphasis on the protection of individuals and their
46
rights, has enabled the Council and its subsidiary organs to exercise their
authority in a way that is much more relevant to those individuals.

43. Nico Krisch, Article 39, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra
note 18, at 1272; INGER ÖSTERDAHL, THREAT TO THE PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION BY THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER 9–17 (1998).
44. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3–15 (1994); N.
D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 164–69 (2d ed. 1997).
45. See WHITE, supra note 44, at 164–69. With respect to Rhodesia, see G.A. Res. 2022 (XX), ¶ 13
(Nov. 5, 1965); S.C. Res. 232, ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 1966); S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 1965). About South
Africa, see G.A. Res. 2054 (XX), ¶ 6 (Dec. 16, 1965).
46. Krisch, supra note 43, at 1279, ¶ 15.
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The extension of the Security Council’s mandate has occasionally met
opposition from member states. For instance, a number of states raised fierce
opposition when the Security Council debated climate change in 2007 as part of
47
the maintenance of international peace and security. At the same time, the
specific oppositions have not amounted to the general claim on the allocation of
competence that the concept of international peace and security (and threats to
the peace) ought to be defined, not by the Security Council, but by the General
Assembly or each member state.
2. Target Specification
The question of competence allocation came to the fore regarding the
process of designing nonmilitary enforcement measures. Since 1994, the
Security Council and its sanctions committees have directly designated specific
individuals and entities as the targets of asset freezes and travel bans instigated
48
under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Before the introduction of targeted
sanctions, the Security Council, having determined the overall strategic targets
of economic sanctions, had still left member states to specify the targets of
restrictive measures. In the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, for
instance, the Security Council required member states to prevent, except for
medical, educational, and humanitarian purposes, the import of all commodities
from Southern Rhodesia, the sale of commodities to any person therein, the
transfer of funds, and the travel of Southern Rhodesian citizens and those
residents who “furthered or encouraged” Southern Rhodesia’s unlawful
49
actions. Although these frameworks were designed by the Security Council, it
was still for member states to specify permissible humanitarian exceptions or
50
residents who furthered or encouraged the unlawful actions. There was then a
sanctions committee, the Watchdog Committee, yet it had only a passive
51
mandate to gather and report information about national implementation. The
targeted sanctions regimes therefore shifted a member states’ competence to
the Security Council and the Council’s sanctions committees insofar as the
designation of specific targets was concerned.

47. U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5663d mtg. at 24–25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5663 (Apr. 17, 2007); U.N.
SCOR. 61st Sess., 5663d mtg. at 12, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5663 (Resumption 1) (Apr. 17, 2007).
48. For a list of targeted sanctions, see Machiko Kanetake, Catching Up with Society—What, How,
and Why: The Regulation of the UN Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions, in L’ÊTRE SITUÉ,
EFFECTIVENESS AND PURPOSES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 255, 262 n.27 (Shotaro Hamamoto et al.
eds., 2015).
49. S.C. Res. 253, ¶¶ 3(a), 3(d), 4, 5(a), 5(b) (May 29, 1968).
50. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law, in
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33, 51–52
(Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004).
51. S.C. Pres. Statement S/8697 (Jul. 29, 1968); S.C. Res. 253, ¶ 20 (May 29, 1968). See P.J. Kuyper,
The Limits of Supervision: The Security Council Watchdog Committee on Rhodesian Sanctions, 25
NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 159–94 (1978).
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3. Direct Implementation
A shift of competence is arguably most comprehensive when the Security
Council, through its subsidiary organs, directly executes its decisions vis-à-vis
individuals and entities, instead of asking national governments to implement
international decisions, as in the case of economic sanctions. Territorial
administration and ad hoc international criminal tribunals are two major
categories of practice in this regard. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the
Security Council’s subsidiary organs directly administered war-torn territories
52
such as Kosovo and East Timor. Although the UN Operation in the Congo
53
had engaged in civil administration in the early 1960s, the administration of
territories by the Security Council’s subsidiary organs became much more
comprehensive in the 1990s. The organs prescribed and enforced a wide range
of decisions that had immediate effect on local inhabitants. In Kosovo, for
instance, UNMIK was vested with “[a]ll legislative and executive authority with
54
respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary.” UNMIK has
55
56
engaged in determining tax rates, administering social welfare, issuing
57
58
59
licenses, resolving property claims, privatizing public enterprises, ordering
60
the detention of individuals, and so on and so forth, just as a government
would, and exercised its authority directly over the local populations.
The creation of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the 1990s
provides another example of when the Security Council’s subsidiary organs
directly executed their decisions vis-à-vis a restricted category of individuals. By
exercising wide discretion under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter for the
61
maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
52. S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999); S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
53. Sally Morphet, Organizing Civil Administration in Peace-Maintenance, 4 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 41, 43–44 (1998).
54. Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, sec. 1.1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999).
55. E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On Excise Taxes in Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/2000/2 (Jan. 22, 2000).
56. E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Establishment of the
Administrative Department of Local Administration, UNMIK/REG/2000/10 (Mar. 3, 2000).
57. E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Licensing and Regulation of the
Broadcast Media in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2000/36 (June 17, 2000).
58. E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Establishment of the Housing
and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, UNMIK/REG/1999/23
(Nov. 15, 1999).
59. E.g., Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Establishment of the Kosovo
Trust Agency, UNMIK/REG/2002/12 (June 13, 2002).
60. See, e.g., Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No. 3 on the Conformity of
Deprivations of Liberty under ‘Executive Orders’ with Recognised International Standards (June 29,
2001), http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E4010629a_526704.pdf.
61. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 28–38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995); Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 61 (July 13 ,1954).
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(ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
63
in 2004. The ICTY and ICTR were accorded authority to issue orders, not only
against the states concerned (namely former Yugoslavian states and Rwanda)
or other UN member states, but also against the accused and other individuals
64
such as witnesses.
4. Deepening the Claims of Supremacy
The aforementioned three groups of practice—targeted sanctions, territorial
administration, and ad hoc criminal tribunals—added another dimension to the
priority of the Security Council’s competence and the supremacy of Charter
obligations. With regard to targeted sanctions, Article 103 of the Charter is
applicable to member states’ obligations to implement the Security Council’s
sanctions and thereby to the designation of specific targets undertaken by the
Council’s sanctions committees. As far as the target designation is concerned,
65
the sanctions regimes allow virtually no discretion to member states. This
would mean that the listed individuals and entities effectively bear the
consequence preserved by the preferential status given to the Security Council’s
exercise of authority.
The claim of supremacy was even deepened with regard to the UN’s
territorial administration and ad hoc criminal tribunals. In the case of territorial
administration in Kosovo, UNMIK’s regulation promulgated by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General and subsidiary instruments issued
thereunder “[took] precedence” over the preexisting domestic law in Kosovo if
66
the latter conflicted with the former. Likewise, the Security Council extended
its claim of supremacy with regard to the ICTY and ICTR. Under the tribunals’
67
statutes, the ICTY and ICTR have primacy over national courts. Under the
tribunals’ rules of procedure, the obligations of states to cooperate with the
68
tribunals “prevail over any legal impediment” to the surrender or transfer of
69
the accused or of a witness to the tribunals. Such normative primacy is
62. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
63. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
64. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 19(2),
adopted 25 May 1993 by Security Council Resolution 827 (last amended by Resolution 1877 of 7 July
2009); ICTY, R. P. EVID. 54, IT/32/Rev.49 (adopted on 11 February 1994, as last amended 22 May
2013) (Dec. 10, 2009). For the details of the ICTY’s decisions and orders concerning individuals’ rights
and obligations, see Shuichi Furuya, Legal Effect of Rules of the International Criminal Tribunals and
Court upon Individuals: Emerging International Law of Direct Effect, 47 NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 111
(2000).
65. Cf. Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 255, ¶ 180 (noting that Switzerland enjoyed
some latitude in implementing the UN’s listing decisions).
66. Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/1999/24, § 1.1 (Dec. 12, 1999).
67. Updated Statute for Yugoslavia, supra note 64, art. 9(2); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Rwanda, 33 ILM 1598, art. 8(2) (1994).
68. Updated Statute for Yugoslavia, supra note 64, art. 29; Statute of Rwanda, supra note 67, art.
28.
69. ICTY, R. P. EVID. 58, IT/32/Rev.49 (adopted on 11 February 1994, as last amended May 22,
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claimed, not only over extradition treaties, but also over national law. The
claim of supremacy over domestic law in the contexts of territorial
administration and ad hoc international criminal tribunals is not derived from
Article 103 of the UN Charter, but is instead based on the Security Council’s
authority under Chapter VII.
III
DECENTRALIZING DECISIONMAKING
As the exercise of authority by the Security Council and its subsidiary
organs increasingly bears resemblance to the exercise of authority by national
governments against individuals, it becomes apparent that legal safeguards
available to the affected individuals at the UN level are significantly
underdeveloped compared to those available at the domestic level, as
highlighted in part III.A. As discussed in parts II.B and II.C, the inadequacy of
human rights protection has generated calls for shifting decisionmaking from
the Security Council to a lower level of governance in part based on the
doctrine of equivalent protection.
A. Respecting Human Rights while Maintaining International Peace and
Security
The UN Charter by no means exempts the guardian of international peace
and security from respect for fundamental rights. Under Articles 24(2) and 1(3)
of the Charter, the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes
of the UN, including the promotion of respect for human rights and for the
universality of fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, the interpretation of these
Charter provisions does not categorically suggest that the UN (and therefore its
organs) is formally obligated to ensure respect for human rights established
71
under customary law or major human rights treaties. Neither the fact that the
UN has international legal personality nor the development of the rules of
international institutional law is sufficient to bind the UN with international
72
human rights law.
The less stringent normative constraint is combined with some pragmatic
obstacles for the UN’s efforts in respecting human rights. First, the UN does not
have a standing judicial venue in which the affected individuals may bring their
human rights claims. Although the Security Council can, in principle, establish
judicial organs whose findings could also bind the Council as far as it is so
73
intended, political stakes may be too high to create a judicial body that has the
2013) (Dec. 10, 2009); ICTR, R. P. EVID. 58, ITR/3/Rev.1 (June 29, 1995).
70. ICTY, R. P. EVID. 58, IT/32/Rev.49 (adopted on 11 February 1994, as last amended May 22,
2013) (Dec. 10, 2009); ICTR, R. P. EVID. 58, ITR/3/Rev.1 (June 29, 1995).
71. See Machiko Kanetake, The Interfaces Between the National and International Rule of Law:
The Case of UN Targeted Sanctions, 9 INT'L. ORGS. L. REV. 267, 278–80 n.37–44 (2012).
72. See id.
73. See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,

8-KANETAKE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2016]

6/13/2016 3:13 PM

THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

177

74

competence to review the Council’s own exercise of authority. Second, if the
provision of legal safeguards involves the handling of intelligence, the UN has
to rely on information provided by member states, since the UN does not have
a general capacity to collect, as opposed to receive, international intelligence
75
concerning certain individuals. To facilitate the receipt of information, the UN
must improve security protocols for the handling of information, security
76
clearances for staff, and disciplinary procedures. Third, the General
Assembly’s Fifth Committee may not be willing to endorse the operational
costs associated with legal safeguards that could further legitimize the extension
of the Security Council’s exercise of authority.
The normative and pragmatic factors have led to various claims that certain
fundamental rights have been jeopardized by the institutional practices of the
Security Council and its subsidiary organs. First, a well-known criticism has
been leveled against the Security Council’s targeted sanctions. The sanctions
77
regime against Al Qaeda in particular, owing to the geographical proliferation
of the targeted individuals, triggered criticism of the encroachment on the
78
individuals’ right to property; a person’s privacy, reputation, and family
79
80
81
rights; the right to a fair hearing; and the right to an effective remedy.
Second, one of the key concerns regarding the UN’s territorial
administrations was their compatibility with the residents’ right of access to
82
courts. Despite being deeply linked with inhabitants, the UN administrations
were protected by jurisdictional immunities and the idea of functional necessity
83
84
to justify them. The aforementioned Behrami and Saramati case was brought
against states that are party to the ECHR, apparently because the applicants
could not have brought comparable judicial proceedings against the UN itself.
The ECtHR’s inadmissibility decision in Behrami and Saramati, which
Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 61 (July 1954).
74. In the context of targeted sanctions, see Machiko Kanetake, Enhancing Community
Accountability of the Security Council Through Pluralistic Structure: The Case of the 1267 Committee, 12
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 113, 166–68 (2008).
75. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
70–71 (2006).
76. Id. at 4, 33–35.
77. S.C. Res. 1989 (June 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1390, ¶ 2 (Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8(c) (Dec.
19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
78. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948).
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
80. Id. art. 14; see Kanetake, supra note 71, at 283 n.59–60.
81. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 79, art. 2(3).
82. See, e.g., Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 1 on the Compatibility with
Recognized International Standards (Apr. 26, 2001), http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/
docs/E4010426a_86354.pdf.
83. Special Representative to the Secretary-General, On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of
KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Aug. 18, 2000). For
UNTAET, see Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN
Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 103, 118 (2002).
84. Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No.
71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
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emphasized the imperative nature of the Security Council’s mandate, therefore
closed the limited possibility for the affected individuals to legally contest the
human rights compatibility of the acts of member states and indirectly those of
the UN.
Finally, the adequacy of human rights protection has also been questioned
with regard to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Particularly
disturbing was the ICTR, which addressed its own infringement of the accused’s
86
87
rights during arrest and detention. In the Semanza case, for instance, the
ICTR’s Appeals Chamber accepted that there were violations in the accused’s
right to be properly informed of the charges and the right to challenge the
lawfulness of his detention. The review by the ICTR itself, however, is limited.
This is because some of these human rights obligations were attributable to
member states, and the ICTR does not have competence to determine the
responsibility of member states for violating human rights during the process of
88
arrest, detention, and imprisonment.
B. Supremacy Counterbalanced
In the absence of international judicial venues to which the affected
individuals can successfully bring their human rights claims against the UN,
some of the individuals, such as the applicants of Behrami and Saramati,
resorted to domestic courts, regional human rights courts, or EU courts to
challenge the compatibility of the implementing decisions of state authorities
with constitutional safeguards and international human rights law. The judicial
proceedings then provided the occasion to test the priority of the Security
Council and the primacy of Charter obligations against the protection of those
individuals’ rights.
Judicial responses have taken multiple forms, ranging from acceptance, jus
cogens review, avoidance, and the use of critical language, to consequential
resistance. On the one hand, judges have indeed accepted the priority of the UN
Security Council and the supremacy of relevant obligations. For instance, there
have been several litigations concerning the orders of the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals on the basis of the compatibility with domestic or
international law of the national decisions that gave effect to the tribunals’
89
orders. Judicial review has generally been lenient. The District Court in The
85. See supra notes 26–28 and corresponding text.
86. For instance, the ICTR accepted the violations of the fundamental rights of the accused in
Barayagwiza (1999, 2000). See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision (Nov.
3, 1999); Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for
Review or Reconsideration) (Mar. 31, 2000).
87. Semanza (Laurent) v. Prosecutor, Decision, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 87, 114
(May 31, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-20/appeals-chamberjudgements/en/050520.pdf; Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 323–39
(May 20, 2005). Likewise, the violations of the accused’s rights were acknowledged in Kajelijeli (2005).
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A, Judgment, ¶¶ 251–53 (May 23, 2005).
88. E.g., Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A, Judgment, ¶ 252 (May 23, 2005).
89. See Jean D’Aspremont & Catherine M. Brölmann, Challenging International Criminal
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Hague, in Milošević v. ICTY, found no competence to assess the human rights
compatibility of the ICTY’s procedures, and in so holding, relied on the ICTY’s
91
primacy over national courts and Article 103 of the Charter. In the earlier case
of Dragan Opacić v. The Netherlands, the Hague District Court likewise found
92
itself unable to review the ICTY decisions. In Lukić Milan s/Captura, the
93
Argentinian court affirmed the priority of the ICTY’s request. The Croatian
Constitutional Court was also willing to accept the ICTY’s primacy over
94
domestic courts in the Bobetko Report case. Likewise, in Naletilić the Croatian
Constitutional Court found constitutional the surrender of the accused to the
95
ICTY, ultimately based on the preference of the Tribunal over national courts.
The Naletilić case was subsequently brought before the ECtHR, which
characterized the ICTY as offering “all the necessary guarantees including
96
those of impartiality and independence.” The trust on the ICTY’s impartiality
97
was reiterated in Milošević v. The Netherlands before the Dutch court.
On the other hand, in several decisions, judges have deferred to the
supremacy of the obligations under the UN Charter, yet still sent a critical
signal to the Security Council and its subsidiary organs that there was some
potential for judicial review. For instance, a Swiss court in the Rukundo case,
which was brought against the state’s decision to transfer Mr. Rukundo to the
98
ICTY, did not decline to engage in a review. Although the Swiss court
ultimately deferred to the Security Council and its subsidiary organ by
presuming the legality of the ICTY’s establishment and procedure, the Court’s
indication might have served as a warning to the Security Council and its

Tribunals Before Domestic Courts, in CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 111, 113–25 (August Reinisch ed., 2011).
90. Slobodan Milošević v. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Hague
District Court, Feb. 26, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1310 (2002).
91. Id. at 1313–14. Similarly, Slobodan Milošević v. Neth, District Court of The Hague, Aug. 31,
2001, 41 I.L.M. 86, ¶ 3.5. (2001).
92. Dragan Opacić v. Neth., District Court of The Hague, 30 May 1997, Kort Geding KG 97/742,
cited in GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION OF
EVIDENCE: OBLIGATIONS OF STATES 144 (2002); Alfred H.A. Soons, The Netherlands, in NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 341, 369 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004).
93. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia v. Lukić (Milan), Case No.
11807/05, Decision on Arrest, Surrender, and Extradition, , ILDC 1083 (AR 2006) (Jan. 10, 2006).
94. Bobetko Report, Croatia, Review of Constitutionality and Legality, Case No. U-X-2271/2002,
ILDC 383 (Nov. 12, 2002).
95. Decision No. U-III-854/1999, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Oct. 21,
1999), http://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksWen.nsf/29e2e5c6bdc241f4c1257de1004a9d1e/ec37116102ae7b6f
c1257e5f003e56b3/$FILE/U-III-854-1999.docx.
96. Mladen Naletilić v. Croatia, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 489, ¶ 1(b).
97. Slobodan Milošević v. Neth., District Court of The Hague, Aug. 31, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 86 (2002).
The Milošević case before the ECtHR was rejected on the basis of the nonexhaustion of domestic
remedies. See Milošević v. Neth., App. No. 77631/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2002).
98. Rukundo v. Federal Office of Justice, Appeal Judgment, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal
Supreme Court] Aug. 31, 2001, Cases No. 1A129/2001 and 1A130/2001, ILDC 348.

8-KANETAKE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

180

6/13/2016 3:13 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:165

99

subsidiary organs to have respect for basic human rights. A somewhat artificial
jus cogens review should also be understood in a similar manner. In its 2005
decision in Kadi I, the General Court (then Court of First Instance) deferred to
the UN Charter’s primacy, which structurally limited the judicial review of
100
Security Council resolutions. Yet the General Court still managed to preserve
101
its judicial scrutiny by resorting to jus cogens, which is often considered
102
superior to UN Charter obligations.
Judges also do their best to avoid the conflicts and the question of Article
103
103 of the Charter, circumventing the pronouncement of their deference to
the supremacy of Charter obligations through multiple techniques. First, courts
can simply refrain from addressing the question of supremacy at all. Although it
is difficult to assess whether or not courts deliberately avoided the question, an
104
example may be the Ntakirutimana case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit regarding the unconstitutionality of the surrender of the
individual to the ICTR. There, the Fifth Circuit did not actively comment on
105
the issue of whether the ICTR had the capacity to protect due process rights.
The second avoidance technique is to interpret Security Council resolutions
in such a way that they are understood as leaving discretion to member states.
The ECtHR in Nada, regarding the implementation of the Security Council’s
Al Qaeda sanctions regime, reinterpreted Council resolutions as if they had left
106
certain latitude to a state. This interpretation allowed the Strasbourg Court to
find Switzerland in violation of the applicant’s rights, on the basis that the state
had the latitude to harmonize its international obligations under Security
107
Council resolutions and its human rights obligations under the ECHR.
The third method of avoidance is to interpret Security Council resolutions
with the rebuttable presumption that the Council acts in conformity with human
rights. The ECtHR in the aforementioned Al-Jedda case applied “a
presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation
108
on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights” and
109
observed that the Council’s resolutions must be read “most in harmony” with
99.
100.
101.
102.

See ERIKA DE WET, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: LECTURE 19 (2011).
Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II–03649, ¶¶ 212–25.
Id. ¶¶ 226–90.
See, e.g., Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, Article 103, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 2110, 2119–20, ¶ 19. Cf. Nico Krisch,
Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 18, at 1237, 1259–60, ¶ 46.
103. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 37, at 52.
104. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999).
105. Id.
106. Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 255, ¶¶ 176–80. Cf. Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 281–84 (Bratza, J., Nicolaou, J., Yudkivska, J., concurring); Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 286–
88, ¶¶ 2–10 (Malinverni, J., concurring).
107. Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 176–180.
108. Al-Jedda v. U.K., 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 373–74, ¶ 102.
109. Id. The presumption is rebuttable. Nada, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 172; Stichting Mothers of
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human rights obligations. In Al-Jedda, the ECtHR managed to avoid a
normative conflict by assuming the conformity of Security Council Resolution
1546 with Articles 1(3) and 24(2) of the UN Charter and therefore the
110
resolution’s human rights compatibility.
Apart from the avoidance of normative conflicts, judges can use critical
language in order to show their dissatisfaction with the UN. For instance, with
regard to targeted sanctions, Justice Zinn of the Canadian Federal Court in the
111
Abdelrazik case criticized the sanctions’ regime against Al Qaeda as “a denial
of basic legal remedies and as untenable under the principles of international
112
human rights,” despite the fact that it was not strictly necessary to refer to the
sanctions committee’s procedure. In A and Others before the U.K. Court of
113
Appeal, an English judge chose the powerful term “prisoners of the state” to
characterize the state of those targeted, which was reiterated by the U.K.
Supreme Court and further by the General Court of the EU in its 2010 decision
114
in Kadi II. In Kadi II, the General Court also described targeted sanctions as
115
“particularly draconian” for the targeted individuals.
In addition to the use of critical remarks, judges can contest the UN’s
decisionmaking by the consequences of judicial findings. This is possible for
domestic and EU courts (but not international courts), which can resort to
dualism and the autonomy of each legal order. By so doing, judges can both
avoid the question of supremacy and consequentially challenge the UN’s
decisions. This was the method employed by the Court of Justice of the EU in
its 2008 decision in Kadi I, in which the Court of Justice defended the autonomy
of the EU legal order and did not fully invite a normative conflict under
116
international law into its sphere of analysis. On this basis, the Court of Justice
has found three-part infringement of Kadi’s rights: to be heard, to an effective
117
legal remedy, and to respect for property.
In summary, from an overview of the judges’ nuanced responses to the
implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and its subsidiary
organs, one can observe a certain level of hesitation among the guardians of
regional human rights treaties and the domestic rule of law in fully accepting
the priority of the Council’s competence and the supremacy of related
obligations within their judicial reasoning.

Srebrenica v. Netherlands, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R 255 ¶ 145.
110. Al-Jedda, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 102.
111. Abdelrazik v. Canada, [2009] F.C. 580 (Can.).
112. Id. ¶ 51.
113. A and Others v. HM Treasury [2008] EWCA Civ 1187, ¶ 125.
114. HM Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and Others [2010] UKSC 2, ¶¶ 4, 60 (appeal taken
from EWCA Civ.); Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-05177, ¶ 149.
115. Kadi, 2010 E.C.R. II-05177, ¶ 149.
116. Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n,
2008 E.C.R. I–06351.
117. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. I–06351, ¶¶ 338–371.
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C. Bosphorus for the UN
Domestic and regional litigation regarding decisions of the Security Council
and its subsidiary organs is likely to continue in the immediate future. The
human rights safeguards at the level of the Security Council and its subsidiary
organs, despite certain incremental improvements, may not be satisfactory
when compared to the domestic standards accepted by some member states. A
question then arises as to whether international law itself justifies the
competence of domestic courts (or other domestic authorities) to review the
Security Council’s decisionmaking, and, as a result of the review, to reject the
decisions of the Council and its subsidiary organs.
One possible ground, albeit within a particular international treaty, is the
applicability of an equivalent-protection test even to a state’s obligation under
Security Council resolutions or the decisions of its subsidiary organs. The test is
118
notably formulated by the ECtHR in Bosphorus v. Ireland. In the case, the
applicant, a Turkish airline, argued that Irish authorities infringed upon its right
119
to property after the authorities had impounded the applicant’s aircraft, which
was leased from a Yugoslavian airline. The impoundment was based on the
regulation of the EU (then–European Communities) derived from Security
120
Council Resolution 820 on the Yugoslavia sanctions. In dismissing the
complaint, the ECtHR put forward the notion of equivalent protection; when
states are obliged to abide by obligations based upon their membership of an
international organization, such states are presumed to be in compliance with
the ECHR “as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect human
121
rights” in a manner “equivalent” to the protection under the ECHR. The
122
presumption is rebutted if the protection is “manifestly deficient.” In
Bosphorus, Ireland was presumed to be in compliance with the treaty because
the European Court of Justice and national courts provided a remedy to
123
individuals.
In principle, the equivalent-protection doctrine cannot readily be invoked
when states must carry out the obligations under the Charter, which prevail
124
over conflicting international obligations under Article 103. While the
Bosphorus case itself was about the implementation of the Security Council’s
economic sanctions to which Article 103 applies, the equivalent-protection
doctrine was nonetheless invoked. This invocation was possible because, first,
118. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107. The test was formulated based on: M. & Co.
& Matthews v. UK. M. & Co. v. The Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 13258/87, 64 DR 138, 145
(Feb. 9, 1990); Matthews v. The U.K., 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251.
119. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 9 ETS 155.
120. Council Regulation (EEC) 990/93, art. 8, 1993 O.J. (L 102/14); S.C. Res. 820, ¶ 24 (Apr. 17,
1993).
121. Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 155.
122. Id. ¶ 156.
123. Id. ¶¶ 163–65.
124. See supra Part II.A.3.
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the ECtHR determined the balance between Ireland’s obligation under the
ECHR and the state’s obligations under EU law, not the balance between the
ECHR and the obligation under the Charter. Second, the Yugoslavia Sanctions
Committee issued guidance to impound the aircraft in question in response to
125
the Irish inquiry and such guidance was less stringent and determinative than
the sanctions committees’ proactive designations of specific targeted
individuals. Finally, the restriction on the right to property can be more flexible
than the individuals’ right to a fair hearing. The conflict between human rights
obligations and the obligations relating to the UN sanctions was not as
irreconcilable as it was in the case of the UN’s targeted sanctions.
Owing to the special status of Charter obligations, the Bosphorus test
initially had not been applied to the cases involving the implementation of the
decisions of the UN Security Council and its subsidiary organs. The ECtHR in
Nada regarding the Al Qaeda sanctions regime referred to Bosphorus, yet not
126
in relation to equivalent protection. The Strasbourg Court in Al-Jedda
concerning the Security Council-authorized multinational force did not discuss
127
Bosphorus despite the fact that the latter case was relied on by the applicant.
The ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati, concerning the UN’s territorial
administration and the Security Council–authorized multinational force,
distinguished the case from Bosphorus on the grounds that the acts and
omissions in Behrami and Saramati were carried out neither by state authorities
128
nor within the territory of the states.
A sign of change emerged, however, with the decision of the ECtHR’s
129
Second Section in Al-Dulimi, which is pending before the Grand Chamber as
of December 1, 2015. In this case, the Court found a violation of the right to a
130
fair hearing of the applicants, who had been designated as targets by the
131
Security Council’s sanctions committee for the Iraq sanctions regime. The
Second Section’s decision was the first occasion on which the ECtHR explicitly
applied the equivalent-protection test, not to the EU, which implemented the
132
Security Council’s resolutions, but to the UN itself. Having accepted that the
listing and delisting procedures at the UN level do not provide equivalent
133
134
protection, four out of seven judges on the Court found that the very
125. Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 19–32.
126. Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 255, ¶ 168.
127. Al-Jedda v. U.K., 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 373–74, ¶ 95.
128. Behrami & Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 43–44, ¶ 151 (2007).
129. Al-Dulimi & Mont. Mgmt Inc. v. Switz., App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, 58, ¶ 118–21
(2013).
130. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4,
1950, ETS 5.
131. S.C. Res. 1518 (Nov. 24, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 23 (May 22, 2003).
132. Maurizio Arcari, Forgetting Article 103 of the UN Charter? Some Perplexities on “Equivalent
Protection” after Al-Dulimi, 6 QIL QDI 31, 31–41 (2014).
133. Al-Dulimi, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 118–121. On the equivalent protection, the
Chamber distinguished Al-Dulimi from Nada on the basis of the lack of member states’ discretion in Al
Dulimi with regard to asset freeze measures. Al-Dulimi, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 117. For the
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essence of the right of access to a court was impaired due to the lack of effective
and independent judicial review at the UN and domestic levels for a
135
considerable period of time. The ECtHR held that
for as long as there is no effective and independent judicial review, at the level of the
United Nations . . . it is essential that [the listed] individuals and entities should be
authorised to request the review
by the national courts of any measure adopted
136
pursuant to the sanctions regime.

This short passage in the decision of the Second Section manifests the claim
of decentralization, or the idea of subsidiarity, discussed in this article.
According to the Court, the lack of judicial review would justify and require
domestic judicial review of the measures that give effect to the UN’s sanctions
regime.
It remains to be seen whether the equivalent-protection doctrine could
potentially serve as a criterion with which to internationally justify the shift of
competence from the Security Council to member states. Even if it does, the
doctrine of equivalent protection itself has not yet been accepted outside the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Finally, the doctrine might not even arise with
regard to territorial administration if the claims instituted against member-state
authorities are rejected via attributing the impugned conduct to the UN.
International law has yet to furnish a yardstick with which to balance the
Security Council’s exercise of authority for the effective maintenance of
international peace and security with member states’ competence to protect
individuals’ rights. Nevertheless, the preferential status of the Security Council
and its mandate has been incrementally counterbalanced by avoidance and
confrontational responses on the part of domestic and regional courts. This
counterbalance contributes to the political deliberation concerning the
allocation of competence.
IV
CONCLUSION
As a treaty established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
137
war,” the UN Charter placed a priority on the effective maintenance of
international peace and security and therefore on its guardian, the Security
Council. The priority is based on the historically embedded assumption that the
need for a swift international response to threats to the peace should override
respect for each state’s autonomous decisionmaking. Consistent with this
summary and analysis of Al Dulimi (2013), see generally Stephan Hollenberg, The Diverging
Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights in the Cases of Nada and Al-Dulimi, 64 INT’L.
COMP. L. Q. 445 (2015).
134. Al-Dulimi, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63 (Sajó, J., partly dissenting) (observing that
the case should be inadmissible due to the lack of discretion left to member states and the supremacy of
the UN).
135. See id. ¶¶ 129–34.
136. Id. ¶ 134.
137. U.N. Charter, supra note 13, ¶ 1.
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assumption, the Charter strongly resists the idea of subsidiarity, which places
greater importance on autonomy at a lower level of governance, in an
essentially decentralized international legal order.
Especially since the 1990s, the UN Security Council and its subsidiarity
organs have been exercising their centralized authority under the Charter in a
way that has had significant impact on individuals and private entities, as
illustrated by the extensive use of targeted sanctions, the direct administration
of war-torn territories, and the establishment of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals. Despite the extent of impact, international human rights law does not
bind the UN in the same manner that it binds UN member states. Nor does the
UN have a standing judicial body accessible to the affected individuals. The
limited human rights protection at the level of the UN has invited growing calls
to leave autonomy to the national level, which is generally assumed to be better
equipped to safeguard individuals’ rights. At present, international law provides
little guidance on how to strike a balance between the competing claims of
centralization and decentralization. The interpretation of the Charter or
international institutional law applicable to the UN does not provide workable
criteria.
The crux is that there are several pragmatic and normative difficulties even
if the UN would be willing to decentralize some of its decision-making
processes. Such difficulties limit the “supply of subsidiarity” discussed in this
138
issue’s introduction. One difficulty is determining the level of member states’
involvement that maintains centralized decisionmaking at the UN. The case of
targeted sanctions reveals the difficulty in determining the most appropriate
involvement of member states. A number of proposals have been discussed in
order to create the space for member states’ decisionmaking and to better
139
ensure respect for human rights. One idea is to condition the Security
Council’s initial designation to the indictment or equivalent decisions by
140
domestic courts. Yet due to the divergence among 193 states—in terms of
their domestic courts’ procedures, admissible evidence, standards of proof, and
degree of independence and impartiality—the member states cannot be obliged
by the Security Council to mutually recognize other national courts’ decisions in
their respective national legal order. An alternative idea is to allow states to
subsequently review the designation initially made by the Security Council and
141
its sanctions committees. Yet this means that the sanctions regimes effectively

138. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 7, at 16–17.
139. See, e.g., Iain Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 72 NORD. J. INT’L. L. 159, 196–214 (2003); Peter Gutherie, Security
Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491, 524–41
(2004); Kanetake, supra note 74, at 164–70.
140. See Cameron, supra note 139, at 204.
141. E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/65/258 (Aug. 6, 2010).
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lose their ability to oblige all states, not only like-minded states, to apply
142
restrictive measures.
Another intricacy involves determining whether member states are indeed
in a better position to protect human rights. The circumstances of ad hoc
international criminal tribunals reveal this dilemma. Due to the dilution of
political support and nonpayment of budget contributions by some UN member
states, the Security Council decided to decentralize the criminal trial and utilize
143
domestic judicial venues as part of the completion strategy proposed in 2000.
The use of national courts facilitates the prosecution of international crimes in a
way that is possibly less costly for the UN itself. For this purpose, the Office of
the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ICTY proposed
the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
144
the Security Council endorsed in 2003.
Yet the decentralization gave rise to the concerns as to whether national
courts could fully conform to “internationally recognised standards of human
145
rights and due process” in the trials of referred persons. The possible
interference by political bodies, the impartiality of judges, and the adequate
146
protection to witnesses were some of the lingering concerns. In fact, the ICTY
rendered several decisions not to transfer cases to the Rwandan national courts,
despite judicial reform, the abolishment of the death penalty, the enactment of
domestic legislation regarding the transfer, and the extensive prosecution of
147
crimes dealt with by the ICTR. At the same time, a positive side of
decentralization is that it subjects decisionmaking to judicial review by
international courts. In fact, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Maktouf and
Damjanović held in 2013 that the War Crimes Chamber within the Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which the ICTY referred its cases, breached Article
7 of the ECHR by retroactively applying the 2003 Criminal Code, as opposed to
the 1976 Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
148
without effective safeguards against the imposition of a heavier penalty. Such

142. For some other difficulties of decentralized review, see Kanetake, supra note 74, at 165–66.
143. S.C. Res. 1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Pres. Statement 2002/21
(July 23, 2002); S.C. Res. 1329 (Dec. 5, 2000); Letter dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (June 19, 2002); Identical
Letters dated 7 September 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/55/382–S/2000/865 (Sept. 14, 2000).
144. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 5 (Aug. 28, 2003).
145. Letter dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (June 19, 2002).
146. E.g., Letter dated 23 November 2004 from the President of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of the Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the
Security Council, ¶¶ 27–32, U.N. Doc. S/2004/897, annex II (Nov. 23, 2004).
147. See Nicola Palmer, Understandings of International Law in Rwanda: A Contextual Approach,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS: RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
153 (André Nollkaemper et al. eds., 2012).
148. Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 26, ¶ 70.
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review might not have been possible had the decision been entirely made by the
Security Council’s subsidiary organ.
Overall, the UN Charter’s initial attempts to resist the idea of subsidiarity
may have been subject to modification. The proper allocation of competence
should be assessed against the objectives sought in a given society, and in this
sense, the relationships between the Security Council and member states should
149
also be viewed “in symbiotic rather than antagonistic terms.” The Security
Council and its subsidiary organs cannot readily escape the demand for greater
utilization of member states in part because the protection of individuals’ rights
is becoming intrinsic to the concept of international peace and security. Given
that both the Security Council and member states are committed to the
maintenance of international peace and security and respect for fundamental
rights, the allocation of competence between them should not be a static matter;
instead, it should be amenable to a constant shift depending on the capacity of
the UN and member states to materialize the shared objectives.

149. Nicholas Tsagourias, Security Council Legislation, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the
Principle of Subsidiarity, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 539, 559 (2011).

